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Summary
A Public Private Partnership (PPP) makes it possible to
disentangle funding from operation. One form of PPP in
education is private operation of publicly funded education.
While evidence is thin, a prominent recent study based on
cross-country data suggests that private operation of
schools with public funding raises student achievement
levels, leading to efficiency gains. If it is accepted that
primary education should always be publicly funded, and if
the superior efficiency of this type of PPP in education is
accepted or presumed, then some issues for policy are: (i)
whether to give public funds directly to schools (supply-side
financing) or as vouchers to parents (demand-side funding);
(ii) to anticipate the potential equity effects of different ways
of giving public funds for private operation; and (iii) to
consider the feasibility of implementing educational PPPs in
developing countries. Experimentation with alternative
delivery modes, accompanied by rigorous evaluation of their
respective efficiency and equity impacts, is desirable before
scaling up interventions.
Private schooling is growing in many developing countries,
including among the poor. Part of the reason for this seems
to be that public schools are performing poorly, with high
teacher absence rates, lack of teaching activity and low
pupil achievement levels (Chaudhury, et. al., 2006; PROBE,
1999; ASER, 2007). Yet, the spread of private schooling
exacerbates social inequality since the poor are necessarily
excluded when private schools are not publicly funded. If
fee-charging private schools increasingly attract households,
it suggests that parents perceive them to be operating with
some competitive advantages relative to public schools. The
nature of these advantages suggests how the private sector
can be utilized to improve educational outcomes of children.
The main avowed advantage of publicly funded but privately
operated education is that it harnesses the expertise, energy
and financial and management skills of the private sector 
to give better value for taxpayers’ money. Proponents argue
that PPPs provide a more flexible way of producing
education, since they allow governments to overcome
inflexible salary scales and other civil service restrictions
and increase transparency of government education
spending by making the cost of education services more
visible (LaRocque, 2005). Decentralised decision-making 
at the level of the school is thought to be more responsive 
to parents’ needs and to foster local level accountability. 
In recent years there has been increased discussion of the
role of PPPs in education, as focus shifts from mere inputs-
based to more incentives-based educational reforms. Figure 1
shows the different combinations of private and public
operation and funding of education. The shaded cells are
PPPs: cell D in the bottom right corner is public operation
with private funding, e.g. fee charging public schools. The
EFA Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2004) finds that more
than 100 countries have public primary schools that charge
some form of fees. Cell A in the top left corner combines
public funding with private operation. Examples of type ‘A’
PPP are voluntary aided schools in the UK, grant-in-aid
schools in India, Charter schools in the US and voucher
schools in Colombia. Using PISA data from 35 countries,
Woessmann (2005) studies the distribution of countries into
these four quadrants and investigates the relative
effectiveness of the four school-types. His statistical analysis
shows that – after controlling extensively for student
background factors – public funding with private operation
brings large gains in terms of maths achievement of students,
while private funding with public operation leads to large
losses in achievement. The pure private and pure public
cases do not differ much from each other, in terms of their
effects on student learning. These findings are summarized 
in Figure 2.
Woessmann’s evidence is based only on a sample of 35
countries for which data were available at the level of the
school on both who operates the school and who funds the
school. Clearly this analysis needs to be broadened to
include a much wider range of countries in order to be
confident about the generalizability of his findings.
Nevertheless, the results are interesting. If Woessmann’s
conclusion is generalizable, i.e. if private operation with
public funding (type ‘A’ in Figure 1) brings efficiency benefits,
then at least three policy questions arise.
Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes & Poverty
Policy Brief 
Public private partnerships in 
education: Some policy questions
Geeta Gandhi Kingdon
number 1  April 2007
2Po
lic
y 
B
ri
ef
Re
se
ar
ch
 C
on
so
rti
um
 o
n 
Ed
uc
at
io
na
l O
ut
co
m
es
&
Po
ve
rty
1 Another form of demand-side financing is cash subsidies to parents conditional on school attendance of their children.  These are often
given to help poor parents to overcome non-fee costs of schooling, and are sometimes targeted at girls’ enrolment. In principle, the effects
can be similar to those of vouchers. Examples of conditional cash transfers are PROGRESA in Mexico and the Bolsa Escola in Brazil. While
these schemes are intended to address demand deficiency, they could in principle impact school quality via inducing competition between
schools in the same way as vouchers.
First, how best to give public funds for privately produced
education? There are two major ways: (a) supply-side
financing, i.e. public money given directly to private schools,
as a block or per-student grant; and (b) demand-side
financing, i.e. public money given directly to families, as a
voucher for each child1. These two ways of giving public
funds for private operation imply fundamentally different
incentives for private schools (see Table 1). The question for
policy is: which of these two ways of setting up the PPP
gives the best incentives to schools and teachers. There is
not much research on this issue. However, evidence for India
suggests that supply-side funding has not produced good
results – block grants to private schools with no incentives
built into the grant structure led to poor student learning
outcomes (Kingdon, 1996; 2007). Also, teachers of aided
schools lobbied hard to be paid directly from the state
government treasury (as public school teachers are paid),
rather than continue to be paid locally by their private school
managements, who received the government grant.
Centralising education Acts in the early 1970s in response to
this teacher pressure led to a massive loss of local level
accountability of aided school teachers toward their private
managers (Kingdon and Muzammil, 2003). Other forms of
supply-side-funding of PPPs exist with arguably superior
incentives for schools and teachers, for instance,
Concession schools in Colombia which receive per-student
public funding (Barrera-Orioso, 2007).
Evidence on the impact of demand-side funding for PPPs (i.e.
for school vouchers to parents) comes mainly from Chile,
Colombia, New Zealand and the US. While the evidence is
somewhat mixed, the weight of this evidence suggests that
voucher funding for private schooling is generally associated
with improved student outcomes. The most reliable evidence,
based on state-of-the-art impact evaluation methodology,
comes from Colombia. The Colombian government issued
school vouchers on the basis of a lottery (due to insufficient
funds for a voucher to all applicants). This provided ideal
conditions for impact evaluation since lottery winners and
losers were from similar home backgrounds, as the voucher
was allocated randomly. Angrist et. al. (2002; 2006) find that
vouchers – which increased parental choice and fostered
competition between schools to attract vouchers – had
beneficial effects on a range of student educational
outcomes both in the short term (3 years) and the longer
term (7 years). 
A second policy question is: what are the equity effects of
demand-side public funding for private education? There is
concern in the literature that vouchers may enable better off
families to supplement the value of the voucher and thus
send their children to the better private schools, but that
poorer families may remain within public schools, some of
which may be left with the poorest and least well performing
students, i.e. vouchers may be detrimental to disadvantaged
students (Ladd, 2002). Nechyba (2005) suggests that such
equity concerns can be addressed by careful design of the
voucher, e.g. by making the voucher amount inverse to family
income, whereby the poorest families would receive the
highest value vouchers. Even so, it remains a real possibility
that  private schools could practice selection on the basis of
pupils’ home backgrounds, in order to cream-skim the best
students and maintain high quality peer-groups. Some people
argue that such inequality can never be totally eliminated. In
poor countries with ill-functioning public schools, better-off
parents already ensure better teaching for their children
anyway via private schooling or via private home tutoring i.e.
it is suggested that mainly-public-school systems do not
eliminate equity problems either, while at the same time
often being less efficient.
The third question for policy concerns the feasibility of
voucher PPP schemes in low income countries. There are
concerns about implementation of school choice schemes in
the developing country context, such as: (i) in rural areas of
low income countries where supply of places is the major
constraint, school choice schemes may be judged irrelevant
since the possibility of there being a choice of schools for
children to attend is remote; (ii) weak regulatory systems to
ensure schools’ compliance with standards; (iii) difficulty of
uneducated parents being able to make informed school
choice; and (iv) the scope for corruption in the presence of
weak monitoring and high costs of verification. However, this
discussion also draws attention to the potential for similar
corruption and monitoring problems in supply-side-funded
PPPs as well as public school systems, and highlights the
need to strengthen administrative capacities of poor
countries to introduce more efficient ways of producing
publicly-funded education.
Given the lack of firm evidence, and given country
specificities, the most apt policy prescription seems to be that
governments considering PPPs should try out both supply-
side per-student funding and demand-side voucher funding
PPPs on a trial basis for a few years and rigorously evaluate
the achievement and equity impacts of these before scaling-
up the more effective and equitable policy interventions.
Acknowledgment: I am indebted to Christopher Colclough 
for excellent comments on this piece. Any errors are mine.
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Operation
Private Public
Funding
Public Voucher/aided schools (A) Pure public (B)
Private Pure private (C) Govt. schools with fees (D)
Note: Grey shaded cells are Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Cell ‘A’ divides into two types, depending on the way in which
public funds are given for private operation of schools. Private schools receiving block or per-student public aid (variously known
as Aided/Charter/Concession schools) are an example of ‘supply side funding’, while private schools funded by school vouchers
given to families are an example of ‘demand side funding’. 
Figure 1   Typology of school types
Source: Woessmann (2005)
Figure 2   Student achievement in the four quadrants of public-private involvement
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Supply side financing Demand side financing
Examples Aided schools, India Voucher schools, Colombia
Concession schools, Colombia Voucher schools, USA
Charter Schools, US Voucher schools, Chile
Voluntary Aided schools, UK Voucher schools, New Zealand
Funding of school By public sector By public sector
Operation By private sector By private sector
Who receives the resource The schools directly Families, as a voucher
Is funding provided on a per pupil basis? Not necessarily: Necessarily per student
Block grants in India
Per student grant in UK, USA
Competition Yes, if grant is per student Yes, since students/families have 
Yes, if students have a choice complete school choice 
of schools
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Table 1 Two ways of giving public funds for private operation
